

CARE

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CARE INTERNATIONAL IN SUDAN

KORDOFAN EMERGENCY RELIEF PROJECT (KERP)

SEPTEMBER TO NOVEMBER 1996

FINAL REPORT

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CARE Sudan through its North Kordofan Food Information Systems (NKFIS) project informed the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the donor community in early November 1995, about the impending food insecurity in North and West Kordofan States. By April 1996, CARE estimated that about 42% of the population (53,418 households) were in critical or immediate need. The GoS requested CARE to implement a targeted free food distribution to mitigate the worst effects of the food shortage in North and West Kordofan. The project, funded jointly by the Overseas Development Administration (ODA), the European Union (EU) and the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), became known as the Kordofan Emergency Relief Project (KERP). KERP proposed to locally procure and distribute 10,000 Mts. of sorghum to 54,000 vulnerable households, classified as being in 'immediate need'.

The ODA and EU provided funds to locally purchase the sorghum, 4000 and 6,000 Mts. respectively, while the OFDA and the EU provided funds for Internal Transport, Shipment and Handling (ITSH) and project Preparation, Management and Supervision (PMS) costs.

The project activities started in the first week of September 1996, and extended until the end November 1996. Initially, the project had intended to provide 416,666 persons with a daily ration of 400g of sorghum for a 60 day period. However, due to significant delays in gaining GoS approval for the local procurement of sorghum, the project only had sufficient time to distribute 4,000 Mts. before harvesting was to commence. GoS delays centered around their insistence that all commodities be purchased solely through para-statal organizations, even though they had previously approved and assisted a joint CARE/Save the Children Fund - United Kingdom (SCF-UK) 'quiet' open tendering process from which 2 private vendors had been selected. A disregard for the open tendering process would have contravened CARE's procurement procedures and donor procurement regulations and was thus unacceptable. Eventually, after considerable delay, the GoS permitted CARE and SCF-UK to purchase all commodities from the original successful tender applicants.

A revised 4,000 Mt. distribution plan was articulated to cover 30 days food requirements at 300g per person per day for a total of 421,640 people characterized as the most needy in 282 villages in 14 rural councils (2 in west Kordofan and 12 in northern Kordofan), beside the 7,601 displaced persons in En Nahud Camp where food was allocated to satisfy a 4 month food requirement.

End use monitoring confirmed that CARE had successfully distributed food to 548,180 needy people in 282 village councils (VCs). • A 30 % increase over the original target number, due mainly to differences in actual village populations against those planned. These population variations resulted in beneficiaries actually receiving an average 30 day ration of 230g per person per day, not 300g as originally intended. Steps are currently being taken to up-date the project's 1993 population census database to

avoid similar problems occurring in the future. In addition, the project successfully supplied 120 days worth of sorghum, at 300g per person per day, to 7,601 displaced persons in the En Nahud camp.

The project recorded total commodity losses of 2,548kg (0.06% of total) all of which occurred during transit. Unlike the previous free food distribution programs in Kordofan, CARE decided to transport food to RC administrative centers instead of the VCs or distribution centers, through transshipment points in Omdurman, Khartoum State and El Obied, North Kordofan. As the losses indicate, the new approach proved very efficient and significantly improved CARE's cost effectiveness through reduced transportation costs.

Overall the project achieved its object of mitigating sufferings due to chronic food shortage, and avoided wide spread out migration from the area in the run up to this year's harvest.

1. INTRODUCTION

Significant food insecurity in North and West Kordofan States has been predicted by CARE's North Kordofan Food Information System (NKFIS) Project since early November 1995. By that time the total average estimated food gap in CARE'S operational area was around 50,000 Mts.

In response to the alarming situation, CARE was initially able to respond in two ways. Firstly, a very highly targeted, but limited, Food For Work project was implemented in the most vulnerable Rural Councils (RCs) in North and West Kordofan that provided 3,234 Mts. of commodities (sorghum, sugar, oil and tea) to assist 87,500 people. The project was supported by The Overseas Development Administration (ODA) and the World Food Programme (WFP). Secondly, funds were secured from The European Union (EU) and the Dutch Government to provide 1,512 Mts. of seed (millet, sorghum, groundnut and sesame) to 204,000 farmers in North and West Kordofan.

CARE continued to monitor the situation through market assessments and surveys. The NKIFS conducted a rapid food security assessment during May - June 1996, which showed that 42% of the population (some 696,214) people remained highly vulnerable and were in immediate need of food assistance if they were to remain in the area until the harvesting period.

The total food requirements for 42% of the population identified as most in need was estimated at 16,710 Mts. This amount would provide 696,100 people in 30 RCs of North and West Kordofan with 400g of sorghum per day for a 60 day period.

In response to the alarming situation, CARE requested donor assistance, through the Kordofan Emergency Relief Project (KERP), for a 2 month targeted free food distribution of 10,000 Mts. of sorghum to assist approximately 416,600 people facing acute food shortage to cover 60 days food requirements at 400g per person per day. The assistance was required to assist farming families in 23 rural councils to keep them in their fields till the harvest in November. While the request for assistance would not satisfy the total need within the project area, it was deemed appropriate in terms of CARE's capacity to procure, transport and distribute the commodities within the response time available.

The EU, ODA and The US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) positively responded to CARE's proposals. The EU agreed to fund the local purchase of 6,000 Mts. of sorghum with accompanying Internal Transport, Shipment and Handling (ITSH) and project Preparation, Management and Supervision (PMS) costs. The ODA agreed to fund the local purchase of 4,000 Mts. of sorghum, while ITSH and PMS costs were covered by OFDA.

CARE entered into an agreement with Save the Children Fund - UK (SCF-UK) to conduct joint procurement of commodities in order to prevent the two agencies from competing against each other for limited grain supplies and thus minimize any additional upward pressure on already spiraling grain prices. In addition to CARE's 10,000 Mts., SCF/UK wished to procure 4,250 Mts. of sorghum for a targeted free food distribution in Darfur State, West Sudan.

CARE also entered into agreements with Save the Children Fund - United States (SCF-US) and the Fellowship for African Relief (FAR) to jointly implement and monitor KERP. SCF/US and FAR have on-going relief and rehabilitation projects in the North Kordofan provinces of Um Ruwaba and Sodari respectively (see Attachment 1 – Project Location Map). Their local knowledge of these areas made a considerable contribution to the smooth and efficient delivery of emergency assistance.

Several factors conspired to delay the initial procurement of commodities. Last year's poor harvest meant there was national shortage grain despite a GoS ban on its export. Thus, sourcing commodities of sufficient quality and quantity through an open tender process proved problematical. GoS insistence that commodities be purchased through para-statal companies contravened CARE procurement procedures and donor regulations, and came after they had already participated in, and approved, CARE and SCF/UK 'quiet' open tendering process. Protracted negotiations with the GoS eventually secured a return to the original selection of suppliers from the open tender bid.

Further delay was encountered when the winning bid price of US\$ 340 per Mt. was rejected by the EU and ODA because it was significantly higher than the prevailing international market price. A ceiling of US\$ 300 per Mt. was set by the EU and followed by the ODA and after a time was agreed too by both commodity suppliers. As a result of the above, the actual implementation of the project was delayed until the beginning of September 1996.

Delays in project start-up meant that there was insufficient time to fully procure and distribute the original 10,000 Mts. before the on-set of harvest. CARE decided that only 4,000 Mts. could be procured and delivered within the remaining time. Accordingly, a revised distribution plan was articulated to cover 30 days food requirements at 300g per person per day for a total of 421,640 people characterized as in immediate need in 282 villages in 14 rural councils (2 in west Kordofan and 12 in northern Kordofan), beside the displaced persons in En Nahud Camp where food was allocated to satisfy 4 months food requirement. The EU agreed to defer their 6,000 Mt. allocation until CARE was better able to reassess the food security situation after the 1996/97 harvest.

Food dispatch of 4,000 Mts. started on 15 October 1996 and the last bag was delivered at the final destination on 26 November 1996 (a total of 42 days).

2. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

2.1 Staffing

The project employed one expatriate Relief Coordinator, a Project Manager, 2 Assistant Project Managers (Logistics and Monitoring), 5 Tasking Officers, a Commodity Accountant, 10 Logistics Officers, a Monitoring Supervisor and 10 Field Monitors (Attachment 2).

In addition, SCF/US and FAR offered the services of some of their Logistics Officers and Field Monitors to assist in food distributions in Um Ruwaba and Sodari provinces.

SCF/US operates in the province of Um Ruwaba and they collaborated by positioning 3 Logistics Officers, 3 Field Monitors and 2 Supervisors to assist in food distribution to the Village Councils (VCs) from RCs of Wad Ashana, Um Ruwaba and Er Rahad. SCF/US also provided the necessary logistical support in terms of vehicles. FAR collaborated by providing 2 of its staff members to operate in Hamrat El Wiz and Gabrat El Sheikh RCs of Sodari province as Logistics Officers.

2.3. Commodity Procurement

The most accepted cereals among the population in the target area are millet and sorghum. Sorghum is the preferred commodity for free food distributions because it is cheaper and usually more readily available on the open market. At the time of purchase levels of commodity availability within Sudan were extremely limited due to the poor harvest of 1995/96. Prices were unusually high and the GoS had banned the export of cereal grains. To avoid driving high prices even higher, CARE in collaboration with SCF/UK conducted a 'quiet' joint tendering process in collaboration with donor representatives and the GoS. The partially open and 'quiet' tendering process identified a number of suitable suppliers who were invited to submit tender applications for the ODA and EU commodity lots.

Conditions for participating in tendering process were that potential suppliers had physical possession of 1,000 Mts. or more of sorghum, and that CARE could immediately verify their stocks. CARE identified the two most acceptable suppliers (price and quantity) and successfully negotiated a single unified price of US\$ 340 per Mt.


The results of the bid analysis were sent to EU and ODA for their approval. As the prevailing international market price was in the region of US\$ 240 per Mt. the ODA and EU rejected the tender price. Both donors agreed on a maximum price ceiling per Mt. of US\$ 300. After further negotiations both commodity vendors agreed to the donors reduced price ceiling.

Due to protracted delays in gaining GoS approval to proceed with commodity purchase from private vendors, as described in the introduction, there remained only sufficient time to effectively deliver 4,000 Mts. before the on-set of harvest.

The EU approved S.G.S. company, through their agent the Gezira Trading & Services Co. Ltd., drew commodity samples for testing and analyzing to ensure compliance with tender specifications. S.G.S. analysis results showed that the bulk of stock offered by both suppliers did not meet the desired quality control standards. New ground pit stocks were offered for inspection and were recommended for purchase by S.G.S. after analysis. Contracts of Purchase were signed with M/S Mohamed Mahmoud Eisa and Ibrahim El Baghr for the supply of 3,000 Mts. and 1,000 Mts. of sorghum, respectively.

2.4. Commodity Flow

The following flow chart is a diagrammatic representation of commodity flow undertaken by KERP.



2.5. Transport

2.5.1. Contracting

Reliable transport companies were invited to offer their quotes for transporting food from the point of purchase to the targeted RCs (delivery points). This method was

adopted instead of open tendering as CARE's experience in the past showed that companies who had no trucks at all, or those with one or two trucks, quoted a lesser rate and were awarded the contract resulting in the job not being completed on time as they were unable to hire the necessary vehicles at an affordable rate.

11 transport companies were contacted to tender with CARE supplying the fuel. The quotes were analyzed and successful bidders were awarded the contracts as shown in table 1 below.

Table 1 Transport Contracts By Company, Quantity and RC Destinations

Transport Company/Quantity	Destinations
El Nourous 2152.791 Mts.	Displaced Persons Camp (En Nahud) Khor Tagat RC El Khowai RC Tayba RC Abu Haraz RC Wad Banda RC Gereijiekh RC Um Eshaira RC El Mazroub RC
Road Transport Unit (RTU) 1027.116 Mts.	Wad Ashana RC Um Ruwaba RC Er Rahad RC
Major Transports 820.081 Mts.	Hamrat El Wiz RC Gabrat El Sheikh RC Sodari RC

2.5.2 Transport Accomplishment and Lessons Learned

Of the above three transport contractors, the RTU did an excellent job of moving food within a few days and there were no complaints from the receiving locations.

El Nourous, though a big transport company with a large fleet of trucks, failed to provide the required number of trucks to move food at an adequate rate. The expectation was that all transport contractors would provide a sufficient number of trucks to move 500 Mts. per day. In reality, the rate of flow varied from 63 MT to 485 Mts. (daily average was 222 Mts.). This variation in transport capacity from the suppliers loading points was the primary factor in distribution delays.

Table 2 below indicates the efficiency of operation by each transport company. A full dispatch report is provided in Attachment 3.

Table 2 Tonnage Transported Over Time by Transport Company

Transport Co.	Oct. 15 - 21	Oct. 22 - 28	Oct. 29 - Nov. 1
RTU	761 ¹	266	0
El Nourous	363	1,176	614
Major	0	609	211
Total	1,124	2,051	825

¹All quantities are in Mts.

There was additional delay by El Nourous at the transshipment point at El Obeid. The strategy was to use large trucks (45 Mts. capacity) for primary transportation (Gedarif to either El Obeid or Omdurman) and transfer the bags into smaller trucks for secondary transportation to the final off loading destinations. The secondary transportation in El Obeid had to be hired from the local operators. Matters were delayed considerably as El Nourous and local operators could not agree on hire charges and fuel quantities. It took the transport contractor El Nourous exactly 30 days to complete the operation which should have been accomplished in a maximum of 12 to 15 days under normal operating efficiency.

The food movement commenced on October 15th from Gedarif and continued until 1 November. The movement from the transshipment point in El Obeid started on 17th October and was completed by November 24th.

It is worth noting that there was no misappropriation of commodities in transit. Even spillage due to bad stitching was negligible. The terms of the agreement with the transport contractors stipulating that they would be responsible for all losses, and that the value of lost/damaged food would be deducted from any final payments. This appears to have had the desirable effect in preventing losses. End use monitoring indicates that KERP recorded a total loss of 2,548kg of sorghum, which represents only 0.06% of the total tonnage programmed.

The responsibility for receiving and loading into smaller trucks rested with the transport contractors and all expenses were at their cost. Their agents signed the waybills, while the CARE Tasking Officer supervised the operation and countersigned the waybills.

3. COMMODITY DISTRIBUTION

3.1. Distribution Plan

Due to procurement delays and the need to complete the distribution before the harvest the original distribution plan prepared for programming 10,000 Mts. was revised to an allocation of 4,000 Mts. (see Attachment 4). RCs with lesser immediate need, as determined through NKFIS data, were dropped from the distribution list and the ration size was lowered to 300g per person per day per. All rations were provided through a one time distribution for the total 30 day assistance period. The rationale for a reduced ration was to try and cover as many of the originally targeted vulnerable VCs as possible and to minimize the extent to which CARE was unable to meet expectations raised from prior notification of community inclusion in KERP. In addition, 120 days worth of sorghum at 300g per person per day was also allocated to the 7,601 people in the En Nahud Displaced Persons camp which CARE is currently managing. The North Kordofan State Government Relief Committee gave their final approval to the distribution plan and RCs were informed accordingly.

Table 3 below provides a summary of the final KERP distribution plan by RC:

Table 3 KERP's 4,000 Mt. Distribution Plan by RC

S/N	Rural Council	Estimated Population	Allocation in MT
1.	Wad Ashana	29,727	267.543
2.	Um Ruwaba	54,801	493.209
3.	Er Rahad	29,596	266.364
4.	Khor Tagat	26,978	242.802
5.	Abu Haraz	33,961	305.649
6.	Um Eshaira	16,811	151.299
7.	El Khowai	34,768	312.912
8.	Wad Banda	44,983	404.847
9.	Tayba	31,865	286.785
10.	Gereijjiekh	11,413	102.717
11.	El Mazroub	8,016	72.144
12.	Hamrat El Wiz	32,204	289.836
13.	Gabrat El Sheikh	46,861	421.749
14.	Sodari	12,055	108.495
15.	Displaced Camp	7,601	273.636
	Total	421,640	4,000.00

In a few VCs there was excess quantity supplied due to inaccurate population figures. Wherever possible the excess quantity was reallocated to other needy places or to other VCs where the quantity allotted was inadequate to cover the actual population.

3.2. Dispatch from Supplier Locations

Sorghum was bagged and transported by the suppliers from sites of ground silos to a convenient point near Gedarif town. Transport contractors provided trucks for loading the bags. CARE hired S.G.S. as the surveyors to ensure the correct approved batches of commodity were loaded in new sacks at a standard weight of 90kg per bag. At least 10 % of the bags were weighed before loading into the truck, ensuring an average weight of 90kg of food in each bag. The Surveyor prepared a loading certificate for each truck load and a CARE waybill was prepared based on the loading certificate.

CARE's Tasking Officer was responsible for all waybill preparation at the loading point. The driver of the truck signed the waybill acknowledging the quantity loaded. The Tasking Officers were present at all times during truck loading ensuring the quality and quantity of food loaded.

The Tasking Officer prepared the CARE waybill according to the priority listing provided to him, depending on the transport contractor. The waybill clearly stated the final destination indicating the transshipment point where applicable.

3.3. Transshipment Points

To facilitate transfer of bags from larger trucks to smaller trucks two transshipment points (TP) were used, one in El Obeid, North Kordofan and another in Omdurman, Khartoum State. The transport contractors arranged and paid for the trucks to carry the food to the final destinations and paid for all incidentals. CARE stationed a Tasking Officer at each TP to ensure proper handling of food and to assist in preparation of onward waybills.

A representative of the transport contractors acknowledged the receipt of the consignment from the larger trucks and issued waybills for the smaller trucks. As stipulated in the contract, bags were directly loaded into smaller trucks.

3.4. Receipt and Issue by Rural Councils

Each RC had nominated one or two RC officials to be responsible for receiving, storing and issuing food to the VCs. CARE had positioned two or more Logistics Officers/Field Monitors to be present at the RC to oversee and assist RC representatives in the execution of their duties. Food received was acknowledged in the waybill by the RC representative.

Adequate storage facilities were provided in almost all RCs. Stock cards were used and an inventory ledger was maintained. CARE waybills were prepared and issued for each and every delivery of food to the VCs. Identification of the authorized representative of the VC was the responsibility of the RC representative. Commodity receipt was signed for by the VC representative while taking delivery.

It was agreed by the RC that the VCs would make their own arrangements for receiving and transporting food from RC level to the VC and its satellite villages. Nearly all VCs had arranged for the lifting of food within a day or two after it was received by the RC.

Food was then received by the village council representative who made the arrangements for transporting food to their villages and its satellites. Returns on sale of empty grain sacks were used to subsidize the transport costs from the RC administrative center to the VC (transport cost per bag ranged from US\$ 0.64 to US\$ 1.43). Where the sale of empty sacks fell short, beneficiaries were levied charges of up to US\$ 0.28 for their full 9kg, 30 day ration of sorghum to cover the outstanding balance.

CARE Field Monitors checked food receipts at village level confirming that food was 100% received at the 282 villages covered by the programme.

3.5. Distribution at the VC Level

The Village Council Relief Committee Chairman distributed the food in turn to the mother village and the satellite villages according to the population. Sometimes a VC had one mother village and seven satellite villages. During monitoring visits it was noticed that the food received was proportionately distributed among all villages depending on the population size. The villages were seen to be using the scoop provided by CARE for measuring out the food to individual households.

The project's aim was to provide food for those people who had no food security or any resources to meet the food needs until the next harvest in late November/ early December. However, while it was possible to target individual VCs within a RC, it was not possible to target individual households within the village due to prevailing social and cultural practices imbedded in Sudanese society. Villagers' tendency is to share whatever available food with their neighbors and relatives. In some cases village committees also decided to share the food with non target villages and satellites.

CARE's original intent had been to distribute 300g per person per day for a period of 30 days. Thus each individual was to receive 9 Kg (three malwas) in total in a one off distribution. While in some villages this was possible, in most the ration size varied depending on the actual beneficiary numbers. During monitoring visits it was observed in most villages the actual population of the village was considerably more or less than the number planned for. Our inquiries with the village authorities invariably appeared to elicit true numbers without any difficulty. In most cases the Village Relief Committee

decided on the ration size based on the actual population and distributed the food accordingly.

The project's beneficiary numbers were based on the figures provided by the GoS¹ and are those used by CARE's NKFIS project. However, several administrative reclassifications had taken place in the meantime contributing to the inaccuracy in our project numbers. In some cases some nomadic populations had settled in villages contributing to the variations.

Wherever possible, CARE took timely action to set right the inaccuracies observed and reallocated the food as necessary. This was not possible in some cases due practical logistical problems. It was unfortunate that this problem could not be identified either by the RCs or the State Relief Committee before actual distribution of food commenced. CARE is currently undertaking a new population census in collaboration with the North Kordofan State Government to establish more accurate demographic details of the project area.

As previously stated the project's initial plan had been to use 4,000 Mts. to cover the immediate food needs of 421,640 people in 282 villages in 14 Rural Councils in North and West Kordofan and the displaced persons of En Nahud Camp at a ration of 300g for 30 days. Due to the fluctuations in population noted above the actual number of beneficiaries who received food was 548,180 persons. This represents a 30% increase on the number of beneficiaries originally planned to be reached by KERP.

However, increased beneficiary coverage resulted in a change to the planned 300g per day ration, where 21% of the targeted population (114,486 people in 41 villages) received less than 200g/day, 79% (426,093 recipients in 241 villages) received between 200 to 300g/day. The average ration received across all villages was estimated to be 230g per person per day.

4. COMMODITY ACCOUNTING

4.1. Base Document

The CARE Food Resources Manual was the project basis on which food accounting was implemented.

Inventory ledgers were maintained at all commodity transaction points - supplier locations, transshipment points and RCs. Waybills were prepared and acknowledged copies were collected from each of these points and verified with corresponding dispatches to trace losses if any. Waybills were prepared for distribution to VCs and acknowledged copies were collected at RC level.

¹ Government of Sudan National Population Census, 1993.

4.2. Reporting

A one time commodity status report (CSR) was submitted by all points involved in commodity transaction - suppliers locations, transshipment points and Rural Councils.

Physical inventory certificates (PIC) were also submitted by the reporting points.

4.3. Loss and Adjustment Reports

Loss and adjustment reports were collected where applicable. It is worth noting that despite initial apprehensions the bags were generally found to be intact and of the correct weight and number as per the waybills. Only four incidence of shortage were discovered. Table 4 below details all losses encountered by KERP.

Table 4 KERP Commodity Losses

LAR #	Location	Qty. Lost (kg)
1257	El Obeid Transit Point	1,620
1076	Hamrat El Wiz RC	270
1752	Abu Hasheem VC	90
1259	Wad Banda RC	568
Total		2,548

5. SUPERVISION AND MONITORING

Adequate numbers of Field Monitors were employed for conducting monitoring visits to all targeted Rural Councils and Village Councils. Logistics Officers also were used in monitoring after they completed distribution in their RC but shifted to another RC. The Field Monitors made a first round visit before distribution of food informing the VCs about the arrival of food, the ration size to be used and the number of days it was to provide assistance for.

After the distribution of food, they made a second round visit ensuring receipt of food and proper distribution of the same. At this point they also collected the yellow copies of the waybills with the signature of the second member of the Village Relief Committee and stamped. They also collected the distribution report and the distribution list with the signatures of the recipients.

For final end use monitoring 36 of the 282 targeted villages (see Attachment 5) were randomly selected (10% within each RC) to conduct interviews and collect data

regarding the food distributed to the beneficiaries. Following food distribution, the selected villages were visited by the project staff where the Village Relief Committees (VRC) were interviewed (see Attachment 6), and a minimum of 10 households were randomly selected to be interviewed (see Attachment 7) to assess "end use" within each of the sampled villages. A total of 489 households were interviewed in the 36 sample villages.

The information collected from the household interviews revealed the following:

- All food distributed via the VRC's was completely received by the beneficiaries.
- The average weight of sacks received was 75% at the original average weight of 90kg/bag, 14% at 89kg/bag and 11% at 88kg/bag.
- In general, more recipients received assistance than originally planned due to the inaccurate population figures used by KERP to draw up the distribution plan as previously explained.
- All beneficiaries had paid for transportation costs from the RC administrative center to the village, except in very few cases where food was transported either directly to a village that was in the RC administrative center, or where villagers transported commodities by local means (cart, camel, donkey, etc.), or where returns from empty commodity sacks fully covered the cost of RC to VC transportation.
- Food distributions to the beneficiaries at village centers were completed in 3 to 4 days using standard scoops provided by the project.
- The average ration received was 230g per person per day. The majority of the population surveyed responded that the food they received will satisfy their family food requirements for 2 weeks. (29.4% responded that food will satisfy 1 week requirements, 70.1% for 2 weeks and only 0.4% for 3 weeks).

During monitoring visits to Abu Haraz RC and later to Karkar VC CARE was informed by the Chairman of the VRC that the RC had asked them to hand over 8 bags of sorghum to benefit the children in a local boarding school. Later it was discovered that the RC had collected a total of 75 bags from different VCs for the boarding school. The RC authorities were called to a meeting at EL Obeid during which the RC authorities informed that the food was voluntarily donated by the VRCs based on the number of children staying in the boarding school from the VC.

Um Sareer VC in Er Rahad had received 40 sacks of sorghum in excess of its need. This was brought to the attention of the RC authorities and the bags were reissued to El Regila village for distribution to the people affected by a fire accident.

These two were the only known incidents where the food was used for purposes other than that intended.

6. PROJECT IMPACT

NKFIS market survey evidence suggests that the supply of cereals increased in the local market when the news began to circulate that CARE was planning to launch a relief programme in the region, forcing down the price of grain staples. For example in Wad Banda and H. El Wiz RCs the price dropped from US\$ 46.43 to US\$ 25.00 per 90kg sack during this time.

While the project exceeded the number of target beneficiaries assisted by 30%, that was achieved at a significantly reduced average ration size of 230g per day, instead of 300g as planned. Furthermore, from the end use survey respondents indicated clearly that the amount provided was insufficient to fully meet their family food requirements for the 30 day period as intended.

Despite these shortcomings, the project did successfully deliver a limited but appropriate amount of highly targeted food assistance to those most in need which mitigated the worst effects of starvation and prevented a substantial out migration of the population from the region just prior to the critical agricultural harvesting period.

7. LESSONS LEARNED

In the execution of KERP CARE adopted a number new methods and approaches aimed at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of CARE's emergency relief operations. The lessons learned from the KERP experience are as follows.

1. Whilst CARE made every effort to include the GoS in the initial start-up phase of the project, greater efforts will need to be made in future to ensure that the protracted delays experienced at the beginning of KERP are not repeated. Developing a closer working relationship with state government officials in securing federal government approvals for project activities and procurement should be done from the outset in future.
2. As already stated, unlike the previous free food distribution programmes in Kordofan, CARE decided to transport food to the Rural Council administrative centers instead of the Village Councils or distribution centers, through transshipment points in Omdurman and El Obied. The advantages were that:
 - a) It proved very cost effective since actual project transportation costs were substantially reduced.
 - b) It reduced delays, diversions and "Ta'adilat"(additional payments made by beneficiaries to truck drivers to ensure food arrival).

- c) It helped develop and promote joint implementation responsibilities between CARE and the local authorities at the RC level which under previous distributions had not occurred.
 - d) Through provision of temporary storage facilities at the RC and with beneficiaries covering transport cost from the RC to the village it ensured that there was some community contribution where previously there had been none.
 - e) It allowed CARE to devote more time to overseeing and monitoring KERP logistics and final commodity receipt as the additional burden of organizing transportation to VCs had been removed.
 - f) Most VRCs were observed to ensure equitable distribution of food rations to all villagers.
3. CARE's joint 'quiet' tendering process with SCF-UK, avoided either agency competing against each other for scarce resources and it kept to a minimum any additional upward pressure on already high market grain prices.
 4. Distribution of commodities in collaboration with SCF-US and FAR proved successful and advantageous from a number of standpoints. Firstly, their superior local knowledge, good relations with communities/local authorities and previous experience of emergency relief in their operational areas greatly assisted the smooth overall implementation of the project. Secondly, their provision of staff and vehicles significantly enhanced the projects implementation capabilities and relieved the strain on CARE's limited and already stretched resources.
 5. Use of CARE's NKFIS project to target emergency relief assistance proved fairly successful both in terms of targeting only those that were in immediate need and for determining the appropriate level of assistance required to mitigate starvation and prevent large scale out migration from the project area. The KERP end use survey demonstrates that while a minimal level of assistance was delivered it was sufficient to prevent people from leaving their farms just prior to the harvest.
 6. A major objective for CARE in the implementation of KERP was that CARE should be able to effectively and efficiently provide emergency relief assistance without disrupting existing programme operations in the project area, as has been the case in the past. Through the selective diversion of existing CARE staff and other resources, hiring of experienced ex CARE staff on short term contracts and developing implementation partnerships with other NGOs, CARE's existing programme of operations remained largely unaffected thus ensuring a satisfactory level programme continuity despite the emergency situation in the project area.
 7. The very low levels of commodity loss, theft or deviation experienced by the project provide a positive indication that CARE's commodity handling and accounting procedures were highly effective.

ATTACHMENTS

Attachment 1 Project Location Map

Attachment 2 Staffing List

Attachment 3 Distribution Plan


Attachment 4 Transportation Dispatch Record

Attachment 5 End Use Monitoring Plan

Attachment 6 Village Relief Committee Interview Form

Attachment 7 Household Monitoring Interview Form

Attachment 1: Project Location Map



Attachment 2 Staffing List

STAFF PLACEMENT

Name	Position	Location
1. Tayfour Osman	Project Manager	El Obeid
2. Mohammed Musa	Assist. Project Manager-Logistics	El Obeid
3. Ahmed Fadul	Assist. Project Manager-Monitoring	El Obeid
4. Abdul Moniem	Tasking Officer I	Gedarif
5. Farahat Mohammed	Tasking Officer II	Gedarif
6. Abdul Hameed	Tasking Officer II	Gedarif
7. Pasquale Ayay	Tasking Officer	Omdurman
8. Jaffar Hassan	Tasking Officer	El Obeid
9. Ismail Sha'a	Logistics Officer	El Obeid
10. Babiker Mohammed	Logistics Officer	El Obeid
11. Ismail Idris Soliman	Logistics Officer	El Obeid
12. El Fatih Hamed Fadul	Logistics Officer	El Obeid
13. Babiker Sa'ad Suliman	Logistics Officer	El Obeid
14. Gizenga Willow	Logistics Officer	El Obeid
15. Abbas Husain	Logistics Officer	Wad Ashana
16. Musa Ahmed	Logistics Officer	Um Ruwaba
17. Mohamed Omar	Logistics Officer	Er Rahad
18. Mohamed Hakimdar	Logistics Officer	
19. Walid Mohamed	Monitoring Supervisor	
20. Mohamed Ali Idris	Relief Coordinator	
21. Ayman Mohd. Nour	Field Monitor	Wad Ashana
22. Hassan Khalil	Field Monitor	Um Ruwaba
23. Ismail Ahmed	Field Monitor	Er Rahad
24. Mudathir Mohamed	Field Monitor	
25. A/Allah Adam Husain	Field Monitor	
26. A/Rahman Mohamed	Field Monitor	
27. Adil A/Rahman Adeel	Field Monitor	
28. Hawa Mohd. Salim	Field Monitor	
29. Stephen Lomeling	Field Monitor	
30. Nicholas G. Kenyi	Field Monitor	
31. Hamza	Commodity Accountant	

Attachment 3 Transportation Dispatch Record

DAILY DISPATCH INFORMATION

QUANTITY IN BAGS OF 90 KGS

RAL COUNCIL/DATE	15/10/96	16/10/96	17/10/96	18/10/96	19/10/96	20/10/96	21/10/96	22/10/96	23/10/96	24/10/96	25/10/96	26/10/96	27/10/96	28/10/96	29/10/96	30/10/96	31/10/96	1/11/96	TOTAL DISPATCHED	ALLOCATION	BALANCE
PLACED CAMP I	500	833	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1333	1333	0
DASHANA	1650	1323	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2973	2973	0
OR TAGAT	0	167	500	0	1000	0	1031	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2698	2698	0
KHOWAI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1000	2477	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3477	3477	0
YBA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	523	0	512	2152	0	0	0	0	0	0	3187	3187	0
MRAT EL WIZ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1500	1720	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3220	3220	0
RUWABA	0	350	1850	700	350	1000	1230	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5480	5480	0
U HARAZ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	848	2048	500	0	0	0	0	3396	3396	0
D BAANDA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1000	2010	525	963	0	0	4498	4498	0
REIJIEKH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	612	529	0	1141	1141	0
PLACED CAMP II	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1707	0	1707	1707	0
BRAT EL SHEIKH	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	310	575	500	960	0	0	1380	961	0	0	4686	4686	0
RAHAD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1320	360	1280	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2960	2960	0
ESHAIIRA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	389	1292	1681	1681	0
MAZROUB	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	802	802	802	0
DARI	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1205	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1205	1205	0
TAL	2150	2673	2350	700	1350	1000	2261	3820	5390	3060	1012	3960	3048	2510	1905	2536	2625	2094	44444	44444	0
TAL IN MTS.	193.50	240.57	211.50	63.00	121.50	90.00	203.49	343.80	485.10	275.40	91.08	356.40	274.32	225.90	171.45	228.24	236.25	188.46	3999.96	3999.96	0.00

Attachment 4 Distribution Plan

Distribution Plan and Actual Distribution For 4,000 Mts Sorghum
Donors: ODA / OFDA

Province & Rural Council	Priority Ranking	Total Number of Villages Requiring Assistance	Individual Requiring Immediate Assistance	30 Days Food Requirement in M. Tons @ 300g/ day / person	Number of Villages Monitored (10% of total or (<10,2 VCs)	Number of bags planned to be distributed 90kgs each	Number of bags Actually Distributed	Deviation ***
UM RUWABA								
WAD ASHANA	1	21	29,727	267.543	3	2973	2973	
UM RUWABA	2	49	54,801	493.209	5	5480	5480	
ER RAHAD	3	18	29,596	266.364	2	2960	2955	*1
TOTAL		88	114,124	1,027.12	10	11413	11408	
SHEIKAN								
KHOR TAGAT	1	20	26,978	242.802	2	2698	2600	*2
ABU HARAZ	2	19	33,961	305.649	2	3396	3396	
UM ESHAIRA	3	14	16,811	151.299	2	1681	1681	
TOTAL		53	77,750	699.75	6	7775	7677	
EN NAHUD								
EL KHOWI	1	22	34,768	312.912	3	3477	3477	
WAD BANDA	2	28	44,983	404.847	3	4498	4498	
TOTAL		50	79,751	717.759	6	7975	7975	
BARA								
TAYBA	1	19	31,865	286.785	2	3187	3187	
GEREIJIEKH	2	12	11413	102.717	2	1141	1141	
EL MAZROUB	3	8	8,016	72.144	2	802	802	
TOTAL		39	51,294	461.646	6	5130	5130	
SODARI								
HAMRAT EL WIZ	1	21	32,204	289.836	3	3220	3217	*3
GABRAT EL SHEIK	2	23	46,861	421.749	3	4686	4685	*4
SODARI	3	8	12,055	108.495	2	1205	1205	
TOTAL		52	91,120	820.08	8	9111	9107	
DISPLACED CAMP	1		7601	273.636		3040	3125	*5
GRAND TOTAL		282	421,640	3,999.99	36	44444	44422	

*** Information awaited from results of Random Sample Monitoring Reports

*1 Excess stock of five bags was recorded in the warehouse of the RC which was reduced in total quantity distributed

*2 Due Inaccurate population numbers between plan and actual excess bags were withdrawn from two VCs.

*3 The RC received three bags less from the transporter- Transit Loss

*4 One of the VCs received one bag less from the transporter - Transit Loss

*5 All excess bags recorded were withdrawn and dispatched to DPP En Nahud

Attachment 5 End Use Monitoring Plan

Kordofan Emergency Relief Project End Use Monitoring And Validation Plan

SI #	Province	R/C	V.C	H/Hs	Sample
1	Um Rawaba	1- W.Ashana	1- Um Nala Alga'alein	177	13
			2- Alrabeita	169	13
			3- Elhashab Elmasabih	235	15
		2- Um Rawaba	1- Um Yajainy	126	11
			2- Touta	177	13
			3- Zaydan	223	14
			4- Um Raira	175	13
			5- Al Rair Jaaida	107	10
		3- El Rahad	1- Allah Kareem	326	15
			2- Gatyat Mousa	49	10
2	Sheikan	1- Khor Taggat	1- Al Khejaijab	140	11
			2- Elgelait	149	12
		2- Um Ishaira	1- Um Gawawa	133	11
			2- Alnala	166	12
		3- Abu Haraz	1- Morie Um Oshosh	159	12
			2- Abu Haraz	687	15
3	Bara	1- Mazroub	1- Elhafeer	210	14
			2- Mazroub	342	15
		2- Tayba	1- Um Higleeg	405	15
			2- El Shegaila	348	15
		3- Geraigikh	1- El Rokab	165	12
			2- El Sararya	131	11
4	NHD	1- W.Banda	1- Um Bull	114	10
			2- Foja	519	15
			3- Eyal Eraibi	105	10
		2- Khowi	1- Almafria <i>Koul</i>	201	14
			2- Alzilaita	174	13
			3- Almigaisim	174	13
5	Sodari	1- Sodari	1- Um Sorra	309	15
			2- Um Khirwi	122	11
		2- G.Sheikh	3- Um Hagar	60	10
			4- Um Ondoraba	645	15
			5- Heraiz Elhamadab	97	10
		3- H.Wiz	1- Sawani Tondab	230	15
			2- Altarak	83	10
			3- Um Darag	283	15

N.B :1- Take the total number of house holds from sugar Butaga at R/C headquarters.

2- Divided the total number of H/Hs you took from Butaga, over the sample size to get your sampling interval for each selected V.C.

3- Selected any random number to start with e.g. you can use a random number from currency.

Attachment 7 Household Monitoring Interview Form

CARE Sudan's 1996 Free Food Distribution
Household Monitoring Form

(1) Interview Date: _____ (2) Food Monitor: _____ (3) VC Sample #: _____
 (4) Village Council: _____ (5) Rural Council: _____ (6) Province: _____

7	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	
	HH Name	HH Size	Amount Rec'd (malwa)	Number of weeks food satisfy HH need.	Amt Paid #malwa S£	Sacks Recvd by VC	Number of Malwa's consumed daily by HH.	Number of goats owned by HH.	Number of Malwa's purchased weekly by HH.	Expected Number of sacks to produce this year by HH.
1					malwa _____ S£ _____		millet _____ dura _____	male _____ female _____	millet _____ dura _____	millet _____ dura _____
2					malwa _____ S£ _____		millet _____ dura _____	male _____ female _____	millet _____ dura _____	millet _____ dura _____
3					malwa _____ S£ _____		millet _____ dura _____	male _____ female _____	millet _____ dura _____	millet _____ dura _____
4					malwa _____ S£ _____		millet _____ dura _____	male _____ female _____	millet _____ dura _____	millet _____ dura _____
5					malwa _____ S£ _____		millet _____ dura _____	male _____ female _____	millet _____ dura _____	millet _____ dura _____
6					malwa _____ S£ _____		millet _____ dura _____	male _____ female _____	millet _____ dura _____	millet _____ dura _____
7					malwa _____ S£ _____		millet _____ dura _____	male _____ female _____	millet _____ dura _____	millet _____ dura _____
8					malwa _____ S£ _____		millet _____ dura _____	male _____ female _____	millet _____ dura _____	millet _____ dura _____
9					malwa _____ S£ _____		millet _____ dura _____	male _____ female _____	millet _____ dura _____	millet _____ dura _____
10					malwa _____ S£ _____		millet _____ dura _____	male _____ female _____	millet _____ dura _____	millet _____ dura _____
11					malwa _____ S£ _____		millet _____ dura _____	male _____ female _____	millet _____ dura _____	millet _____ dura _____
12					malwa _____ S£ _____		millet _____ dura _____	male _____ female _____	millet _____ dura _____	millet _____ dura _____
13					malwa _____ S£ _____		millet _____ dura _____	male _____ female _____	millet _____ dura _____	millet _____ dura _____
14					malwa _____ S£ _____		millet _____ dura _____	male _____ female _____	millet _____ dura _____	millet _____ dura _____
15					malwa _____ S£ _____		millet _____ dura _____	male _____ female _____	millet _____ dura _____	millet _____ dura _____
16					malwa _____ S£ _____		millet _____ dura _____	male _____ female _____	millet _____ dura _____	millet _____ dura _____
17					malwa _____ S£ _____		millet _____ dura _____	male _____ female _____	millet _____ dura _____	millet _____ dura _____
18					malwa _____ S£ _____		millet _____ dura _____	male _____ female _____	millet _____ dura _____	millet _____ dura _____
19					malwa _____ S£ _____		millet _____ dura _____	male _____ female _____	millet _____ dura _____	millet _____ dura _____
20					malwa _____ S£ _____		millet _____ dura _____	male _____ female _____	millet _____ dura _____	millet _____ dura _____

Attachment 6 Village Relief Committee Interview Form

CARE Sudan's 1996 Free Food Distribution Village Council Relief Committee Interview Form

(1) Interview Date: _____ (2) Food Monitor: _____ (3) VC Sample #: _____
 (4) Village Council: _____ (5) Rural Council: _____ (6) Province: _____

Total number of sacks received by VC and date arrived in VC.	(7) Sacks _____ (8) Date _____
What was the average weight per sack received.	(9) Avg.WHT _____
Total cost for transporting food from RC to the VC.	(10) Cost _____
Total amount charged to HH's for food. (Sudanese £ or quantity of food)	(11) S£ _____ #malwa _____
Total amount of food distributed. (# of sacks) and date of distribution.	(12) Amount _____ (13) Date _____
If not fully distributed, when will it be distributed and where is it being stored. (physically observe the stored food and count the number of sacks - any differences should be reported immediately). (# of sacks stored)	(14) Date _____ (15) # Sacks _____
Total number of HH's who received food.	(16) #HH _____
Target number of individuals to receive food (internal data - not from VC committee).	(17) Target _____
Total number of individual's who received food.	(18) #Individ _____
Difference between target and actual numbers that received food. (target - #Individ)	(19) Difference _____
Targeted ration per person. (intern data - not from VC committee)	(20) Target _____
Ration (malwa's) provided per person by VC.	(21) Ration _____
Difference between target and actual ration provided. (target - ration)	(22) Difference _____
How long will the food distributed satisfy HH food requirements? (# of weeks)	(23) Weeks _____
Estimate the number of mukhama's of cereal (millet and dura) planted this year.	(24) Planted _____
Estimate the number of sacks that will be produced (millet and dura) this year.	(25) Yield _____

Remarks: _____

